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Abstract 
In this paper, we study the effects of bureaucratic corruption on fiscal policy and the 
subsequent impact on economic growth. Here corruption takes three forms: (i) it reduces 
the tax revenue raised from households, (ii) it inflates the volume of government 
spending, and (iii) it reduces the productivity of ‘effective’ government expenditure. The 
analysis distinguishes between the case where fiscal choices are determined exogenously 
to ensure a balanced budget and the case where the government optimally sets its policy 
instruments. Our policy experiments reveal the complexity of the channels through which 
corruption impacts upon growth, and the conditions under which the direction of the 
effect takes shape. The findings from our unified framework could rationalise the diverse 
(and sometimes, apparently conflicting) empirical evidence on the impact of corruption 
on economic growth offered in the literature. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last two decades, a voluminous literature has emerged, which studies the causal 
factors of economic growth and development. Within this literature, an increasing 
number of studies have focused on the links between corruption and growth, on the one 
hand, and fiscal policy and growth, on the other. In other words, the two areas have often 
been examined independently of each other. Recent studies have, however, unveiled that 
corruption in the public sector impacts on both the level and the composition of public 
revenue and expenditure, thus influencing the conduct of fiscal policy-making. The 
natural next step, therefore, is to consider how corruption affects economic growth by 
fleshing out this fiscal policy transmission channel. This is how we identify the main 
objective of this paper. 
Corruption, the abuse of public office for private gain, is a major problem 
afflicting developed and developing countries alike.1 There is a voluminous literature on 
the effects of bureaucratic corruption (see Bardhan (1997), Jain (2001), Aidt (2003, 
2009), and Svensson (2005) for comprehensive reviews). The relationship between 
corruption and growth, in particular, has been investigated in numerous studies with the 
direction of the effect being in dispute. Some of the literature has been in support of the 
so-called “speed money” hypothesis, according to which corruption can be beneficial to 
growth by helping to circumvent cumbersome regulations (red tape) in the bureaucratic 
process (e.g., Leff (1964), Huntington (1968), Lui (1985)). The bulk of the literature, 
however, overturns the “efficiency” argument of corruption and views corruption as 
being more than a price mechanism that leads to lower growth through a number of direct 
or indirect channels. Amongst these, corruption may cause a misallocation of talent and 
skills away from entrepreneurial activities towards rent-seeking activities (e.g., Murphy 
et al. (1991) and Acemoglu (1995)), it may create obstacles to doing business and impede 
innovation and technological transfer (e.g., Hall and Jones (1999)), and it may cause 
                                               
1
 A point that ought to be made clear at the outset is that we are, in this paper, attempting to capture “petty” 
corruption rather than “grand” corruption. The former occurs when bureaucrats running the administration 
are corrupt, while the government is benevolent; with the latter, the government itself is corrupt. (See Rose-
Ackerman (1999) for a distinction.) 
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firms to expand less rapidly, to adopt inefficient technologies and to shift their operations 
to the informal sector (e.g., Sarte (2000) and Svensson (2005)).  
The literature on fiscal policy and growth has mostly concentrated on the effects 
of different types of expenditure on growth (see, among others, Barro (1990), Futagami et 
al. (1993), Devarajan et al. (1996), Turnovsky (1997), Turnovsky and Fisher (1995), and 
Agénor (2008)). In contrast, the literature on the effects on growth of the method of 
financing such expenditures is much sparser. De Gregorio (1993), Palivos and Yip 
(1995), Miller and Russek (1997), among others, deal with this issue. Although, in 
general, the two most common financing methods – income taxation and seigniorage – 
are both considered distortionary in terms of growth, there is no consensus on the relative 
merits of tax versus money financing of public spending. For example, Palivos and Yip 
(1995) consider income-tax financing to be worse than seigniorage financing, whereas De 
Gregorio (1993) generally argues the opposite. Bose et al. (2007) link the optimal mode 
of financing to the levels of development, i.e., they find that for low-income (high-
income) countries, financing expenditures with revenue generated by income taxation 
(seigniorage) is less distortionary for growth. In a similar vein, Holman and Neanidis 
(2006), in a small open economy model, find that the adverse growth effects of 
seigniorage are more prominent than those of income taxes for economies that are less 
financially developed. Miller and Russek (1997) find that a tax-financed increase in 
public spending in developing countries actually leads to higher growth, while that in 
developed countries lowers growth. None of these papers, however, attribute corruption 
as a factor that affects the relative efficiency of seigniorage as against income taxation. 
In the context of public finances, corruption may impact independently on both 
the expenditure and revenue sides of the government’s budget: corruption can distort the 
composition of expenditures by shifting resources towards items where the possibility of 
inflating spending and obtaining more “commissions” is higher and also where there is 
greater scope for indulging in covert corruption, as alluded to by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993). Corruption can also alter the manner by which revenues are generated, e.g., by 
shifting from tax to seigniorage revenues when part of the tax proceeds do not accrue to 
the government and is usurped, as suggested by other empirical evidence. Also Ghura 
(1998), Imam and Jacobs (2007), and Tanzi and Davoodi (1997, 2000) conclude that 
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corruption reduces total tax revenues by reducing the revenues from almost all taxable 
sources (including incomes, profits, property, and capital gains). The implication is that, 
ceteris paribus, other means of raising income must be sought, and one of the most 
tempting of these is seigniorage. Significantly, it has been found that seigniorage is 
closely linked with inflation (see Cukierman et al. (1992)), and that inflation is positively 
related to the incidence of corruption (e.g., Al-Marhubi 2000), while seigniorage, itself, 
has a negative effect on growth (e.g., Adam and Bevan (2005); Bose et al. (2007)). It is 
these observations that provide the motivation for this paper, which seeks to explore the 
influence of various forms of bureaucratic corruption on public spending and finance, and 
the implications of this for growth and development. 
Here corruption features in three distinct ways: On the expenditure side, there are 
two types of effects: first, corrupt officials inflate the size of the public spending, not for 
increasing the size of the national cake, but for their own pecuniary gain; secondly, 
although the amount of public spending is higher than warranted, the productivity arising 
out of such spending is considerably lower than it would otherwise have been.2 Although 
some of these aspects have been captured in previous empirical papers (see Mauro (1995, 
1998), Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), and Haque and Kneller (2008), among others), explicit 
analytical conditions have not been derived in the literature on the effects of corruption in 
public finances. On the revenue side, corruption in tax administration implies that not all 
tax revenues end up in government coffers, as some of it is embezzled by corrupt 
bureaucrats involved in tax collection. 
Our analysis is based on an endogenous growth model in which capital 
accumulation is governed by the portfolio allocation decisions of financial intermediaries 
on behalf of agents. Following Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Espinosa-Vega and Yip 
(1999, 2002), we consider a scenario in which individuals are subject to random 
relocation shocks that create a trade-off between investing in a productive, but illiquid, 
asset (capital) and a non-productive, but liquid, asset (money). Intermediaries, which 
receive deposits from individuals, optimise this trade-off by choosing a composition of 
portfolio that depends on the relative rates of return of the two assets. An increase in 
                                               
2
 Olson et al. (2000) attribute the cross-country differences in growth of total factor productivity (TFP) to 
differences in governance, but do not show any explicit theoretical link between (various forms of) 
corruption and growth as we do.  
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inflation, which reduces the return on money, causes a portfolio re-allocation away from 
capital investment (loans to firms) towards greater cash holdings in order to guarantee 
adequate provision of liquidity services for those agents who are forced to relocate. 
Against this background, we study the effects of corruption on growth and development.  
In this connection, we consider first the case of a benevolent government which 
passively adjusts its revenues/expenditures (to ensure a balanced budget) in response to 
corruption, and then that of a government which chooses its instruments optimally to 
maximize a social welfare function comprising of the lifetime utilities of all agents – both 
honest and corrupt – over generations.3 We show that while the workings of the model 
are different in the two cases, there are elements of ambiguity in the choice of appropriate 
policy instruments and the growth effects in both, which implies that the issue of whether 
a government takes a passive or an active stance is actually not that critical.4 
Our results could provide a rationale for the empirical findings of some recent 
papers emphasizing the conditional (or non-monotonic) effects of corruption on growth 
via the political institutions/governance environment. Specifically, Méon and Sekkat 
(2005) considering interactions between indicators of the quality of institutions and 
corruption, report that corruption is most harmful to growth where governance is weak. 
In contrast, Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) argue that the negative impact of corruption 
on growth materializes only at high levels of incidence in countries characterized by 
political freedom.5 Aidt et al. (2008) find a similar result: in countries with high quality 
institutions, corruption has a large, negative impact on growth. In our analysis, the 
comparative-static effects of corruption on growth show that a connection can be made 
with these papers. More specifically, we find that for countries that are able to generate 
insubstantial amounts through seigniorage (true generally for the developed nations), 
corruption that inflates public spending increases the tax rate and reduces growth. This 
result ties in with Bose et al. (2007), who find that tax-financed public spending retards 
growth in developed nations.  
                                               
3
 Note that corruption at an individual level is undetectable in our model, and hence, is exogenously given 
in the aggregate. An optimizing government consequently has to design a second-best fiscal policy, taking 
into account the welfare of all agents. 
4
 In the analysis, we have identified conditions under which a government could use its policy to mitigate 
the effects of corruption, so that steady state growth increases. 
5
 The authors follow Ehrlich and Lui (1999) in distinguishing “free” and “non-free” countries via the 
Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties. 
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Clearly, the value added of our paper stems largely from the fact that to date we 
have not found any study that considers the effects of corruption through both sides of the 
government budget constraint, although empirical evidence has been provided in that 
direction. In addition, we capture these effects for a non-optimizing as well as an 
optimizing government. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical 
model, and characterizes the balanced growth path of the economy. Section 3 analyses 
the effects of corruption on the key economic variables when a government allows an 
exogenous adjustment of its fiscal instruments to ensure a balanced budget. Section 4 
captures the effects of corruption under an optimizing government. Finally, Section 5 
contains a few concluding remarks. 
 
2. The analytical model 
 
Consider an overlapping generations economy in which there is an infinite sequence of 
two-period-lived agents. Each generation of agents is comprised by private citizens (or 
households) and public officials (or bureaucrats). Households work for firms in the 
production of output, whilst bureaucrats work for the government in the administration of 
public policy. All agents work only when young and consume only when old. 
Consumption is financed from savings with financial intermediaries that make optimal 
portfolio choices on behalf of agents by allocating their deposits between liquid and 
illiquid assets. This role of intermediaries is created by the existence of idiosyncratic 
relocation shocks which also motivate a demand for liquidity. This financial friction 
provides a link between the monetary and the real side of the economy. 
The government generates revenue by taxing labour income and by printing 
money (seigniorage), and undertakes expenditures on public goods and services. 
Corruption takes shape in three different ways. Firstly, some bureaucrats appropriate tax 
revenues for themselves; secondly, some bureaucrats inflate the cost of public services; 
and thirdly, corruption reduces the efficiency of the public good in the production 
process. Finally, firms, of which there is a unit mass, conduct all of their business in 
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perfectly competitive product and factor markets. The economy is described in more 
detail as follows. 
 
2.1. Agents 
There is a constant population (normalised to one) of two-period-lived agents belonging 
to overlapping generations of dynastic families. Agents are divided at birth into a 
fraction, µ, of households and a remaining fraction, 1-µ, of bureaucrats.6 Both households 
and bureaucrats work only when young and consume only when old, deriving lifetime 
utility according to 
1
, 0tt
cU
σ
σ
σ
−
+
= − > , (1) 
where ct+1 denotes old-age consumption. 
All young agents are endowed with the same unit amount of labour which is 
supplied inelastically to a given occupation (private employment or public service) in 
return for the same labour income of tw .
7
 This income is deposited as savings with 
financial intermediaries. As in Espinosa-Vega and Yip (1999, 2002), we introduce some 
uncertainty into the model by assuming that a typical agent is born at a point in time in 
one particular location, where he resides in the first period of his life. In the second 
period, with probability q (0 < q < 1), this agent relocates to another location. The 
uncertainty of individuals about their future location is important for determining the 
composition of savings which can take two forms - a liquid, but unproductive, asset 
(money) and an illiquid, but productive, asset (capital). Although the return on capital is 
higher than that of money, there nevertheless exists some demand for cash as the latter is 
‘mobile’ because of its liquidity and is therefore demanded by agents who relocate. We 
assume that these shocks are identically and independently distributed across agents who 
prefer to save through intermediaries, rather than by themselves, because doing so allows 
them to exploit the law of large numbers in eliminating individual risk. We study this in 
detail in our subsequent analysis. 
                                               
6
 As in Blackburn et al. (2006) and Sarte (2000), we abstract from issues relating to occupational choice 
and assume that agents are differentiated at birth according to their abilities and skills. 
7
 This has a similar interpretation to the allocation of talent condition as in Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), 
whereby the government is able to induce potential bureaucrats to take up public office by paying them 
salaries that they would earn elsewhere. See also Blackburn et al. (2005) and Haque and Kneller (2008). 
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2.2. Firms 
Households work for firms in the production of output. There is a unit mass of firms, 
each of which combines tl  units of labour with tk  units of capital to produce ty  units of 
output according to 
1[ (1 ) ]t t t ty Al k Gα β βξ χλ −= − , (2) 
( ))1,0(,,0 ∈> βαA , where tG  denotes productive public goods and services. We assume 
that expenditure on public goods and services is a fixed proportion of output, 
tt yG θ= , ( ))1,0(∈θ . The actual productivity of public goods and services, however, is 
less than what would have been in the absence of corruption. Specifically, as it is made 
clear in the next section, (1 )ξ χλ−  is the “effective” productivity of public spending, 
with χλ being the amount by which corruption reduces efficiency. This consideration is 
consistent with Bandeira et al. (2001) where corruption reduces the productivity of 
effective public investment.8 
Given this, the firm maximises its profits by hiring labour at the real wage rate tw  
and renting capital at the real interest rate  tr  so as to satisfy the condition of perfect 
competition in factor markets. Observe that equilibrium in the labour market requires 
tl µ= , so that with the use of tt yG θ= , equation (2) can be written as: 
,tt bky =  (2’) 
where [ ]( ) .0)1( 11 >−≡ − ββα θχλξµAb   
Using (2’), the equilibrium factor prices are shown to be 
tt k
b
w
µ
α
= , (3) 
brrt β== , (4) 
with equilibrium wages being proportional to the capital stock and the equilibrium 
interest rate being constant. 
                                               
8
 Corruption has also been found to diminish the productivity of private capital and total factor 
productivity. The former effect is illustrated by Lambsdorff (2003) while the latter by Dar and 
AmirKhalkhali (2002).  
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2.3. Bureaucrats 
Bureaucrats work for the government in the administration of public policy. Specifically, 
public officials are divided into those that work on revenue collection (ν) and those that 
act in the procurement of the public good (1-ν). This means that ν(1-µ) bureaucrats 
collect revenues and (1-ν)(1-µ) procure public goods. The revenues collected by the 
bureaucrats are represented by a fixed proportional tax rate, )1,0(∈τ , the government 
levies on wage earnings, tw . The public goods and services procured by the bureaucrats 
have a real value tG  and, as described above, contribute to the efficiency of the firm’s 
output production. From the ν(1-µ) bureaucrats that collect revenues, we assume that (1-
η) are corrupt. We also assume that a fraction χ of the officials that procure the public 
good are also corrupt.9  
The above imply that on the revenue side, each official collects taxes from 
)1(/1 µν −  private sector employees so that collected tax revenues by each bureaucrat 
correspond to )1(/ µντ −tw . However, only the non-corrupt among the bureaucrats 
involved in revenue collection bring the tax proceeds to the government. Hence, total tax 
revenues provided to the government by all non-corrupt officials are described by twητ . 
As a result, tax revenues appropriated by corrupt officials are given by twτη)1( − . On the 
spending side, each official is responsible for the procurement of )1)(1/( µνθ −−ty  
public goods, which corresponds to the amount each non-corrupt official procures. Each 
corrupt official, on the other hand, artificially inflates public spending to an amount equal 
to 0),1)(1/()1( >−−+ εµνεθ ty . Here, ε represents the size by which spending is 
inflated due to corruption. Therefore, total spending on public goods ( tg ) is given by 
.)1( tt yg θχε+=  (5) 
This means that actual spending on public goods increases due to corrupt practices as 
only tyθ  of total public spending is utilised in the firms’ production function. The 
                                               
9
 The distinction between corruptible and non-corruptible bureaucrats may reflect differences in 
proficiencies at being corrupt or differences in moral attitudes towards being corrupt (e.g., Acemoglu and 
Verdier (2000); Blackburn et al. (2006); Tirole (1996)). At a secondary level, we also make a distinction as 
to the number of corrupt officials on the two sides of the government budget constraint: (1 ) (1 )η ν χ ν− ≠ − . 
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remaining amount of tyχεθ  represents the illegal income (i.e., embezzlement) of corrupt 
bureaucrats. Such practices have been stressed empirically by Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) 
who show that corruption inflates public capital expenditure, as the scope for indulging in 
corrupt practices is much higher for this type of spending. 
As mentioned in the previous section, corruption in our model also leads to a 
productivity loss, but only in the context of the procurement of public goods by corrupt 
bureaucrats. Specifically, we assume that each unit of the public good yields a 
productivity of ξ units when procured by (1-χ) non-corrupt bureaucrats, but only ξ(1-λ) 
units when this is procured by the χ corrupt bureaucrats. Therefore, the parameter 
)1,0(∈λ  captures the productivity loss of public spending due to corrupt practices. 
Incorporating this aspect, we find that each non-corrupt official is responsible for 
procurement of public goods that yield productivity of )1)(1/( µνξ −− , while the 
respective productivity of each corrupt official is )1)(1/()1( µνλξ −−− . Thus, total 
productivity generated from public goods is given by )1( χλξ − , as noted in the previous 
section. It is clear, therefore, that a higher value of λ, which represents more corruption, 
leads to lower productivity of public spending.  
The importance of (a high level of) productivity with which physical and human 
capital are used in contributing to output per worker has been stressed by Hall and Jones 
(1999). They contend that social infrastructure – which comprises of the institutions and 
government policies that make up the economic environment within which economic 
agents operate – contributes to the success on each of these fronts. Likewise, in our set-
up, government procurement of public goods could be interpreted as contributing to 
social infrastructure, and the productivity of this is undermined in the presence of 
corruption.10  
 
2.4. Government 
A benevolent government provides public services, gt, that (partially) contribute to 
private productivity, as in Barro (1990). The government also pays bureaucrats’ salaries, 
                                               
10
 Hall and Jones (1999) mention thievery, expropriation and corruption among the sources of “diversion” 
of social infrastructure. 
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which, as already described, earn the same salaries as that of households, wt. It follows 
then that the total real wage bill for the government is tw)1( µ− . The revenue side of the 
government’s budget constraint comprises seigniorage and tax receipts. The first term on 
the left-hand-side of equation (6) denotes real revenue from money printing or 
seigniorage, while the second term gives the actual amount of tax revenue available to the 
government: 
ttt
t
tt wgw
P
MM )1(1 µητ −+=+− − , (6) 
where from (5) we need to assume that 1)1( <+ θχε  so as to place an upper limit to 
government spending as a fraction of output. 
In the analysis, we consider two different ways the government responds to 
corruption. First, we assume that the government allows for an exogenous adjustment of 
its fiscal instruments in order to ensure a balanced budget. We then consider the case 
where the government optimally chooses its instruments to maximize some social welfare 
function. The comparison between exogenous and endogenous fiscal policy adjustment 
gives us the opportunity to examine the extent by which the link between corruption and 
growth varies according to policy-making decisions. 
 
2.5. Financial intermediaries 
Financial intermediaries manage the savings of individuals and make portfolio allocation 
decisions in the interest of their depositors. The portfolio consists of money and capital, 
each of which has benefits and costs: money provides liquidity insurance for agents who 
are relocated, but does not pay any rate of interest; capital provides a rate of return for 
agents who do not relocate, but is unavailable to those who move. Individuals take the 
help of financial intermediaries – who are viewed as being formed as cooperatives from 
young households, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) – as the latter are able to exploit the 
law of large numbers and thereby to eliminate individual risk.11 Let δ (0 < δ < 1) be the 
                                               
11
 Instead of assuming that financial intermediaries operate as cooperatives drawn from households, one 
could consider such intermediaries as competing for the depositors, as in Bencivenga and Smith (1993). In 
that case, any (extra) economic profits that may accrue would be offered to depositors and therefore be 
competed away among the intermediaries, which in effect implies that competition leads to financial 
intermediaries acting in the best interests of depositors. 
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fraction of deposits lent to firms (i.e. held in the form of capital), which implies that a (1-
δ) fraction is held in the form of money. Also, let it (It) denote the gross real rate of return 
paid to depositors who move (do not move) location. Finally, the variable, )( 1+≡ ttt PPR , 
which is the gross rate of deflation, denotes the real rate of return on money holdings, and 
is taken as given by the financial intermediaries. 
It ought to be noted at this point that for households, as well as for non-corrupt 
bureaucrats, labour income (wt) is the only source of earnings. However, for corrupt 
public officials involved in revenue collection, twτη)1( −  is the amount appropriated 
illegally, while for the corrupt bureaucrats involved in public procurement, tyχεθ  
represents the amount embezzled. We assume that these corrupt officials manage to 
escape punishment either because their actions are undetectable and/or governments find 
it difficult to implement punishment strategies due to resource constraints (which is true 
especially in developing countries). We also assume that whatever is embezzled by such 
officials is saved via “non-standard” channels: in other words, the usual mode of saving 
via financial intermediaries described above only applies to the legal component of the 
income of corrupt officials (i.e., labour income), but not to the funds embezzled while 
undertaking revenue collection and public procurement. If that would have been the case, 
then the offenders would be exposed with certainty. 
The optimisation problem facing financial intermediaries involves choosing δt, it 
and It, so as to maximise the expected utility of a representative depositor 
[ ] [ ]
σ
τ
σ
τ σσ −− −
−−
−
−=
tttt
t
Iw
q
iw
qV )1()1()1( , (7) 
subject to 
ttt Rqi )1( δ−= , (8) 
(1 ) t tq I rδ− = . (9) 
The financial intermediaries’ portfolio problem is to maximise the expected 
welfare of a depositor who deposits his entire labour income with them; and this 
depositor faces a probability, q, of being relocated (thereby receiving it), and a 
probability, 1-q, of remaining in the same location (thereby receiving It). This is given by 
 13
equation (7) above. The resource constraint in (8) conveys the information that the 
financial intermediaries are able to meet the liquidity needs of the depositors who do 
relocate using their real money holdings, while (9) shows that the intermediaries are able 
to make the requisite payment (out of their lending to producers of capital) to the fraction 
of depositors who do not relocate. 
The solution of this problem yields the optimal share of deposits invested in 
capital to be 
)(
1
1
1
1
1
t
t
t
t R
r
R
q
q
r
R
q
q
∆≡






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
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

−
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+
σ
σ
σ
σ
δ , (10) 
where 0)(' >∆ tR , implying that a decrease in Rt, the return on money, induces 
intermediaries to allocate a larger fraction of deposits towards cash holdings. This is 
because in the presence of higher inflation (i.e., lower Rt), intermediaries find it difficult 
to provide sufficient liquidity for agents who relocate, unless they hold more money. This 
income effect of a change in inflation implies that more money needs to be held and a 
smaller proportion of deposits can be allocated to productive capital.12 
 
2.6. Balanced growth equilibrium 
Along the balanced growth equilibrium, which is unique and stable, all variables grow at 
the same rate. The growth rate is determined from the capital market equilibrium 
condition where the total demand for capital by firms, 1+tk , equals the total supply of 
capital by financial intermediaries, ttw δ  (which equals the investment in capital made by 
the intermediaries out of the deposits accruing from all agents). 
From ttt wk δτ )1(1 −=+ , we use equation (3) to obtain ,/)1(/1 µδατ ttt bkk −=+  or 
),()1(1 Rb
k
k
t
t ∆−=≡ +
µ
ατγ  (11) 
                                               
12
 This result is by now standard in studies that use this modeling framework. See Espinosa-Vega and Yip 
(1999, 2002). 
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where γ is the economy’s equilibrium growth rate. From eq. (11), it is clear that γ  
responds positively to Rt. This is because a higher return on money (captured by higher 
Rt) eases the liquidity constraint for financial intermediaries, thereby enabling agents’ 
savings to be channelled towards capital, which spurs growth. 
Denoting t t tm M P≡  as the real value of money balances, we can express the 
money market clearing condition as )1()1( ttt wm δτ −−= , or using (3) and (10) obtain 
[ ] tt kRbm )(1)1( ∆−−= µ
ατ
. (12) 
An increase in Rt (lower inflation) implies that lower money holdings are required to 
satisfy the liquidity demands of households who relocate, and this is reflected in eq. (12). 
Of course, in the steady-state, we have ,/// 111 tttttt yymmkk +++ ==≡γ . Using 
1t tm mγ −= , the government revenue from seigniorage can be expressed as 
γγ /)(/)( 1 tttt mRPMM −=− − . Then, combining equations (12) and (11) we obtain 
)(/)](1[)(/)( 1 RRkRPMM tttt ∆∆−−=− − γ . 
Next, using the above expression for seigniorage, along with equations (2’), (5), 
and (13), we can rewrite the government budget constraint equation, (6), as 
µ
αµθχετ
µ
αηγ )1()1()(
)(1 −
++=+





∆
∆−





 −
R
R
b
R
. (13) 
The first term on the left-hand-side of the above expression denotes the seigniorage 
revenue of the government. This seigniorage revenue is the product of the (productivity-
adjusted) inflation tax rate and the (growth-adjusted) inflation tax base. The second term 
to the left of the equality is the tax revenue accruing to the government from the η-
proportion of non-corrupt tax collectors. The first term to the right of the equality is the 
spending on procurement of public goods (which includes the inflating of public 
expenditures by corrupt bureaucrats), while the second term on the right-hand-side 
represents the salary payments made to bureaucrats, who comprise (1-µ)-proportion of 
the population. 
As our task is to understand the effects of corruption (in its different forms) on 
economic growth, and given that growth and fiscal instruments are jointly determined 
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through the government budget constraint, we need to consider the simultaneous system 
described by equations (11) and (13). Accordingly, we need to take the total derivatives 
of equations (11) and (13). Doing so, yields 
λ
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(13’
) 
We now use equations (11’) and (13’) to perform a number of comparative statics 
exercises, highlighting the role of the different aspects of corruption on the revenue and 
expenditure sides of the government’s budget, and eventually on growth. As already 
mentioned, the analysis distinguishes between the exogenous adjustment and the optimal 
choice of instruments by the government. These are described in the following sections, 
and enable us to obtain some interesting results. 
 
3. Corruption and growth in the decentralized equilibrium 
In this section, we examine the impact of the various forms of corruption (collection of 
tax revenue, procurement of public goods, and productivity of public goods) on growth 
by considering a passive stance by the government. That is, in response to corruption, the 
government is assumed to adjust its fiscal instruments to keep a balanced budget. To this 
effect, we examine independently the revenue generating and spending instruments. In 
particular, with regard to the creation of public revenue we examine three distinct cases: 
i) only seigniorage can vary, (ii) only the income tax rate can vary, (iii) both revenue 
sources are allowed to vary.  
 
3.1. Seigniorage as the single source of variation in government revenue 
Even though this may reflect an extreme case, the reliance of many countries (developing 
countries in particular) on seigniorage is a reality, often due to an inefficient tax system, 
making seigniorage a relatively inexpensive source of revenue (see Cukierman et al. 
(1992), De Gregorio (1993), Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995)). In our model, this case 
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amounts to setting changes in the rate of income tax equal to zero, 0dτ = , in equation 
(13’). This, in turn, implies that changes in seigniorage are used to match any changes in 
public spending (level effect), or compensate for any changes in tax revenue for a given 
level of government outlays (revenue composition effect). 
 Appendix A(I) illustrates how equations (11’) and (13’) look in matrix form under 
the above condition. It also shows how the gross rate of deflation, R, and the rate of 
economic growth, γ, react to higher incidents of corruption as these materialise through 
the three different channels we consider. The results of these exercises take shape through 
the propositions below. 
 
Proposition 1a: Given a path of public expenditure (dθ = 0) and no fiscal consolidation 
(dτ = 0), an increase in corruption related with the collection of tax revenue (decrease in 
η) increases seigniorage and decreases the steady-state growth rate. 
 
This result reflects a negative effect of corruption on growth through changes in 
the composition of public revenue toward more seigniorage. This finding is consistent 
with the empirical evidence provided by Blackburn et al. (2010) and the work of De 
Gregorio (1993). The former shows that a shift in the composition of public revenue 
toward more seigniorage at the expense of lower income taxes yields negative growth 
effects, while the latter highlights the role of an inefficient tax system which due to high 
tax collection costs produces high inflation rates and low economic growth. The 
incidence of tax collection costs across countries has been documented by Bird and Zolt 
(2005), who report that developed countries devote roughly one percent of tax revenues 
to cover the budgetary costs of tax collection. The costs of tax administration for 
developing countries, on the other hand, are substantially higher–almost three percent, 
according to Gallagher (2005). In our setup, the source of this inefficiency in tax 
administration arises out of corruption in the collection of public revenue. 
 
Proposition 2a: Given a path of public expenditure (dθ = 0) and no fiscal consolidation 
(dτ = 0), an increase in corruption related with the procurement of productive public 
goods (increase in χ) increases seigniorage and decreases the rate of steady-state 
growth. 
 17
 
This result corresponds to a negative effect of corruption on growth through 
changes in the level of public revenue toward more seigniorage – for a given amount of 
revenue collected through taxation – due to an increase in public spending. At the same 
time, corruption diminishes the productivity of public spending which has a direct 
negative effect on growth. This result is in line with the empirical evidence provided by 
Adam and Bevan (2005) and Bose et al. (2007), who illustrate that greater reliance on 
seigniorage as a means of financing public expenditure generates distortionary effects on 
growth. 
This case represents an example of a situation where a particular type of 
corruption that operates on the expenditure side of the government budget constraint 
(manifested through a higher value of χ), affects the growth rate not only via inflated 
public spending, but also via shifts in revenues toward more seigniorage. Even though in 
both Propositions 1a and 2a the outcome of higher corruption is lower economic growth, 
the difference is that in the former case the negative growth effect of a rise in seigniorage 
is a direct consequence of the fact that less tax revenues are generated (lower η). In the 
latter case, however, the growth effect (via higher χ) of higher seigniorage is indirect - 
strengthening the direct negative productivity effect on growth. 
In addition, in both Propositions 1a and 2a, higher corruption induces higher 
inflation as the government relies more on seigniorage, a result empirically confirmed by 
Al-Marhubi (2000). Our contribution, therefore, lies in the fact that we identify two 
distinct channels through which corruption could lead to higher inflation: lower η 
(revenue side of the budget) or higher χ (expenditure side of the budget). 
 
Proposition 3a: Given a path of public expenditure (dθ = 0) and no fiscal consolidation 
(dτ = 0), an increase in corruption related with the productivity of public goods (increase 
in λ) increases seigniorage and decreases the steady-state growth rate.  
 
This result now reflects the direct negative effect of corruption on growth through 
a decline in the productivity of public goods, and an indirect negative effect through 
changes in the composition of public revenue toward more seigniorage causing inflation 
to rise (decline in R) and the growth rate to fall. As regards the direct productivity effect, 
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an empirical study by Salinas-Jimenez and Salinas-Jimenez (2007) analyses whether 
corruption affects the economic performance of countries from a productivity-based 
perspective. By considering a sample of 22 OECD countries for the period 1980-2000, 
they show that corruption affects TFP growth, with economies that have lower levels of 
corruption recording, on average, faster growth rates.  
Here, too, the change in an expenditure-side parameter has an indirect effect on 
growth via the revenue side of the government budget constraint. Note that the link 
between higher corruption, higher inflation and lower growth remains as before; here, 
due to lower effective public spending (due to higher λ) being financed by seigniorage.  
 
3.2. Income tax as the single source of variation in government revenue 
Although this too, is an extreme case, it is the limiting case of maintaining a very low rate 
of inflation. This is the experience of many developed countries, like the US and UK, and 
members of the European Union which have quite independent central banks with a 
commitment to maintain inflation within a specified target--as we know there is a strong 
positive relation between inflation and seigniorage (see Cukierman et al. (1992)). Very 
low reliance on the inflation-tax as a source of revenue could be expected from 
governments abandoning a regime of financial repression of the sort described by 
Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995).13 
 Within our model, this case corresponds to setting changes in seigniorage revenue 
equal to zero in equation (13’). This, in turn, implies that any changes in spending or 
changes in tax revenue are matched by changes in the tax rate. Using this condition, the 
new matrix form expression for the set of equations (11’) and (13’) appears in Appendix 
A(II). This Appendix also presents the comparative static exercises as to the effect of the 
three types of corruption on inflation and growth. Once again, we present the findings of 
these experiments in the form of the following Propositions. 
 
                                               
13
 From a policy perspective, the World Bank (1989) has stressed the importance of reducing permanently 
the need for seigniorage revenues. 
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Proposition 1b: Given a path of public expenditure (dθ = 0) and a constant revenue from 
seigniorage, an increase in corruption related with the collection of tax revenue 
(decrease in η) increases the income tax rate and decreases the steady-state growth rate. 
 
This straightforward result states that if corruption causes income tax revenue to 
drop, in the absence of an alternative method of raising revenue, the government has no 
other option but to increase the income tax rate in order to generate revenue to match the 
revenue lost due to corruption.14 As a result, the increase in the rate of income tax leads 
to a lower growth rate by diminishing the after tax income available for investment 
purposes.15 
 
Proposition 2b: Given a path of public expenditure (dθ = 0) and a constant revenue from 
seigniorage, an increase in corruption related with the procurement of productive public 
goods (increase in χ) has an ambiguous effect on both the income tax rate and the steady-
state growth rate. 
 
This result reflects an ambiguous effect of corruption on growth through changes 
in the level and the productivity of public spending. Intuitively, an increase in χ raises the 
size of government spending. At the same time, however, it decreases the productivity of 
output, b, and therefore the tax base, which would have caused seigniorage revenue to 
rise (via a shift from income taxation). But given the constant revenue from seigniorage, 
if the tax rate has to fall to maintain the government budget constraint, then (given the 
fall in b), it is not clear how the growth rate would react. However, if the income tax rate 
has to rise in equilibrium, then (together with the fall in b), the growth rate falls.  
An alternative way to view this ambiguity is to re-write equation (13) as: 
                                               
14
 De Gregorio (1993), in a model without corruption, shows that if the government is able to collect a 
smaller fraction of tax revenues (reflecting a more inefficient tax system), the tax rate has to increase when 
the rate of money creation is zero. 
15
 One could relate this correlation between higher tax rates and lower growth rates to the level of 
development along the lines of the analysis of Bose et al. (2007), where tax-financed increases in 
government spending thwart growth in richer nations. A more inefficient tax system (arising due to 
corruption in tax collection), a feature of many developing countries, would lead to lower tax revenues and 
reduce growth. 
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An increase in χ decreases output productivity, b, so that the revenue side of equation 
(14) declines while the expenditure side may change in any direction. If expenditures 
rise, then for a balanced budget the tax rate needs to rise, so that the decrease in output 
productivity and the simultaneous increase in the tax rate inhibit the rate of growth. 
Similarly, the growth rate will decline if expenditures decrease (when the increase in χ 
dominates the decline in b) but by less than the decrease in revenues. If, however, 
spending goes down by more than revenue, then for a balanced budget the rate of taxation 
will decline. In this case, the decrease in both output productivity and the tax rate yield 
offsetting effects on growth. The relative size of the declines in b and τ will determine in 
which way economic growth will move. Overall, it is clear that corruption has an 
ambiguous effect on both the income tax rate and the rate of growth. 
 
Proposition 3b: Given a path of public expenditure (dθ = 0) and a constant revenue from 
seigniorage, an increase in corruption related with the productivity of public goods 
(increase in λ) decreases the income tax rate and has an ambiguous effect on the steady-
state growth rate.  
 
An increase in corruption associated with a lower output productivity of public 
goods, b, causes both the revenue and expenditure elements of the government budget to 
decline (see equation (14)). It is unclear, however, which element of the budget will 
decrease by a greater extent. If the decline in expenditure exceeds (falls below) the drop 
in revenue, then given a fixed revenue from seigniorage, this will induce a lower (higher) 
income tax rate to ensure a balanced budget. Our calculations show that the tax rate is 
actually lower as a result of the rise in λ, which implies, therefore, that the decline in 
spending is higher than the reduction in revenue. In the light of this finding, the 
ambiguity of the growth result seems fairly intuitive. It reflects the direct negative effect 
of corruption on growth through a decline in the productivity (b) of the public good, and 
a contrasting positive effect on growth through a lower income tax rate (τ).  
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3.3. Both seigniorage and income taxation as sources of variation in government revenue 
As the above two classes of experiments, where governments are restricted in the use of a 
single revenue-generating mechanism, may lack realism, we now consider the effects of a 
joint use of both seigniorage and taxes as means of financing public outlays. This case 
simply amounts to the combination of the former two exercises. Combining Propositions 
1a and 1b, one can state the following: 
 
Proposition 1: Given a path of public expenditure (dθ = 0), an increase in corruption 
related with the collection of tax revenue (decrease in η) increases both seigniorage and 
the income tax rate and decreases the steady-state growth rate. 
 
Comparing our results with studies linking tax systems with inflation and growth 
performance, we note that in De Gregorio (1993), a more inefficient tax system leads to a 
fall in the share of income tax revenues because the share of seigniorage increases, but 
the effect on the tax rate is ambiguous. The rate of growth of inflation increases, and the 
rate of growth of output falls unambiguously. Also, Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) 
show that governments in countries with inefficient tax systems (high tax evasion) may 
optimally choose a high rate of money growth leading to high inflation rates, high 
seigniorage and low economic growth. As these papers do not explicitly deal with 
corruption, our study identifies a specific channel through which such inflation and 
growth effects could materialise from inefficient tax systems. 
Combining Propositions 2a and 2b, we obtain the following result 
 
Proposition 2: Given a path of public expenditure (dθ = 0), an increase in corruption 
related with the procurement of productive public goods (increase in χ) increases 
seigniorage and has an ambiguous effect on the income tax rate. Although an increase in 
seigniorage leads to a lower steady-state growth, a decrease in the income tax rate has 
an ambiguous effect on growth. 
 
Even though the impact of this type of corruption on the rates of income tax and 
economic growth is ambiguous, it is possible to derive an unambiguous effect by 
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considering the original distribution of government revenue between seigniorage and 
taxes. The following Corollary illustrates this (see Appendix A(III) for details). 
 
Corollary 2.1: Given a path of public expenditure (dθ = 0), for a small amount of 
seigniorage revenue, an increase in corruption related with the procurement of 
productive public goods (increase in χ) increases the income tax rate and leads to a 
lower steady-state growth. 
 
The intuition of this corollary follows from equation (13). For a small initial size 
of seigniorage revenue, the rise in revenue from seigniorage due to a decline in output 
productivity, b, caused by an increase in χ, falls short of the rise in spending, so that the 
tax rate needs to be raised. In this case, the drop in b and the rise in τ jointly lead to a 
decline of the growth rate. 
This corollary may rationalize the empirical findings of Mendez and Sepulveda 
(2006), who show that the negative effect of corruption on growth is confined mainly to 
“free” countries. The idea is that in countries with more political rights, it is possible that 
corruption promotes some public investment that is otherwise thwarted by bureaucratic 
delays (see Huntington (1968) and De Soto (1990)), and also that it is worth allowing a 
small amount of corruption in the economy as the resources required for combating it are 
quite large (see Klitgaard (1988), and Acemoglu and Verdier (1998)). So, a small but 
positive level of corruption may be optimal for the economy. Also, Aidt et al. (2008) find 
the effect of corruption on growth to be strong only in countries with a high quality of 
political institutions. Given that “free” countries and countries with a high quality of 
political institutions are typically developed nations, and given that seigniorage revenue 
is typically small for developed nations, we can draw a comparison between our findings 
and the governance-growth results of the above studies. We can claim that Corollary 2.1 
supports the finding that the negative effect of corruption on growth clearly materializes 
for developed countries (that generate a small revenue through seigniorage) at higher 
levels of taxes. This allows us to tie our result with the recent empirical literature in this 
area. 
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This result can also be compared with the theoretical and empirical results 
obtained by Bose et al. (2007) that in developed countries (with efficient tax collection 
systems), government spending financed by taxes retards growth more than if financed 
by seigniorage. Although that paper is not about corruption, its introduction offers a clear 
link between the findings of our study and the results reported there. 
Finally, combining Propositions 3a and 3b, one can make a general statement 
about the effects of productivity-related corruption when both seigniorage and taxation 
can be used to create revenue for the government. 
 
Proposition 3: Given a path of public expenditure (dθ = 0), an increase in corruption 
related with the productivity of public goods (increase in λ) increases seigniorage and 
decreases the income tax rate. The increase in seigniorage yields a lower steady-state 
growth rate, while the decline in the income tax rate has an ambiguous effect on steady-
state growth. 
 
As in Proposition 2, the growth effects of corruption are not clear. Once again, 
however, we can draw unambiguous effects if we account for the original composition of 
public revenue (see Appendix (AIII)).  
 
Corollary 3.1: Given a path of public expenditure (dθ = 0), for a small amount of 
seigniorage revenue, an increase in corruption related with the productivity of public 
goods (increase in λ) leads to a lower steady-state growth. 
 
The intuition of this corollary is similar in spirit to Corollary 2.1. For a small 
initial size of seigniorage revenue, the rise in revenue from seigniorage due to the decline 
in output productivity, b, is relatively small. Given that spending remains unchanged, the 
marginal increase in seigniorage needs to be matched by a decline in tax revenue. This 
induces a decline in the tax rate, which along with the drop in b cause the rate of growth 
to decline, suggesting that the latter effect (drop in b) dominates in magnitude the former 
(drop in τ). 
Overall, Propositions 1, 2, and 3 imply that seigniorage and the income tax rate 
may not change in the same direction due to corruption and that their subsequent effects 
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on growth may differ depending on the type of corruption taking place. This also 
activates different channels through which the effect of corruption on growth is 
transmitted through. Thus, our framework by involving various forms of corruption could 
account for the existence of apparently conflicting results obtained in the growth 
literature as a function of the impact of different expenditure financing policies.16 
 
3.4. Adjustments in public expenditure 
We now examine the case where the government keeps its sources of revenue constant 
(both the tax rate and rate of inflation) and allows only exogenous adjustments in 
spending. Thus, the effects of corruption are now transmitted through the expenditure 
side of the government budget constraint. Appendix A(IV) illustrates how equations (11’) 
and (13’) look in matrix form under such a restriction. The impact of the different forms 
of corruption on the share of government expenditure (as fraction of GDP) and on 
economic growth, is summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4: Given a constant income tax rate and rate of return on holding money, an 
increase in corruption of any form (collection of tax revenue, procurement and 
productivity of public goods), has an ambiguous effect on both the share of government 
expenditure and the steady-state growth rate. 
 
 The intuition of these outcomes is best illustrated with the use of equation (14), 
and resembles the explanations given for propositions 2b and 3b. Specifically, a decrease 
in η decreases the revenue side in equation (14). The question now is: in which direction 
shall θ move to equilibrate the budget? Keeping in mind that output productivity, b, is 
positively influenced by changes in θ, we have a number of plausible outcomes. On the 
one hand, θ can increase, so that along with the increase in b, the expenditure side in 
equation (14) rises. But the rise in b will also increase the revenue side, so that if the rise 
in b exceeds the decline in η, a balanced budget is possible. Alternatively, θ can decline 
in response to a drop in η so that both sides of the budget will go down until a new 
                                               
16
 As described in the Introduction, for example, Palivos and Yip (1995) find seigniorage financing to have 
a smaller negative effect on growth than income tax financing, while De Gregorio (1993) generally finds 
the opposite. See also Miller and Russek (1997), who find that tax-financed public expenditures result in 
higher growth in developing countries. 
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equilibrium is achieved, assuming that the spending side will decrease by more. 
Moreover, the change in θ causes a change in the growth rate of output in the same 
direction through its impact on productivity. Thus, it is unclear in which way θ will adjust 
due to higher corruption on the collection of taxes, leading to ambiguous growth effects. 
 An increase in corruption related with the procurement of public goods, χ, leads to 
a decline in b so that the revenue side of equation (14) declines, while total expenditure 
may either fall or rise. If expenditures rise, then for a balanced budget, θ needs to drop, 
which will further reduce b. The double drop in b, due to the original increase in χ and the 
subsequent decreases in θ, diminishes the rate of growth. If, on the other hand, spending 
goes down by more than revenue, then for a balanced budget, θ will rise. This, in turn, 
will drive up both sides of the constraint. In this case, the offsetting effect of a higher χ 
and higher θ on productivity will have an ambiguous effect on growth. As before, this 
type of corruption also has unclear implications for the share of government spending and 
output growth. 
 Finally, an increase in λ, by decreasing output productivity, causes both sides of 
the budget to decline. But it is not identifiable which of the sides will decrease by more. 
If spending declines by more (less), then θ needs to rise (decline) to rebalance the budget. 
Once again, therefore, the impact of corruption is generally ambiguous. However, the 
general ambiguity of the effect of all types of corruption on both government spending 
and long-run growth can be identified as being related to a single variable: the size of 
public expenditure relative to the size of the economy, g/y. The following corollary 
illustrates this. 
 
Corollary 4.1: Given a constant income tax rate and rate of return on holding money, if 
the share of government expenditure as a fraction of total economic activity is relatively 
large (small), an increase in corruption of any form, decreases (raises) both the share of 
government expenditure and the steady-state growth rate. 
 
 The exact expression of the threshold value of government spending-to-output 
appears at the end of Appendix A(IV). If g/y, or θχε )1( + , is relatively large, a decrease 
in η which decreases the revenue side in equation (14), calls for a decline in θ so that both 
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sides of the constraint decrease. Given that g/y is large, the expenditure side will decrease 
by a greater amount to catch up with the initial decline in revenue due to corruption, and, 
thus, equilibrate the budget. The drop in θ leads to a lower steady-state growth rate of 
output. If instead θ were to increase, then both revenues and expenditures would rise but 
the latter would do so by more so that the budget would not have been balanced. 
 In a similar way, with a large government size, increases in χ and λ require a 
decline in θ for a balanced budget to be retained, followed by lower output growth. The 
increase in χ decreases the revenue side of equation (14), while the large and increasing 
size of θχε )1( +  leads to greater expenses, even with a lower b. To restore budget 
equilibrium, a downward adjustment of θ is needed. Finally, an increase in λ, even though 
causes both sides of the budget to decline, with a large government size, revenue declines 
by more. This, in turn, calls for lower θ. 
The corollary supports the presence of non-linear effects of corruption on growth 
with the sign of the impact being contingent on the size of the government: corruption in 
an environment with a small government improves growth, while in a large government 
impedes growth. Even though the mechanism of transmission of these effects focuses 
purely on public spending considerations, other studies have unveiled conditional effects 
of corruption on growth by focusing on political institutional quality (Mendez and 
Sepulveda (2006), Meon and Sekkat (2005), and Aidt et al. (2008)). Studying interaction 
effects between corruption and government size in growth regressions could, therefore, 
be a worthwhile task. 
 
4. Corruption and growth with optimal (second-best) economic policy 
In the previous analysis, the role of the government has been “passive” in response to 
corruption, in the sense that its fiscal choices were determined by adjusting either the 
revenue or the expenditure side to ensure a balanced budget. This means that the 
government has not been choosing its instruments optimally in a way as to maximize 
some social welfare function. In this section, we examine whether the results obtained 
thus far as to the links among the key fiscal variables, corruption and growth are robust to 
an approach that allows for the government to be “active” in its choices of fiscal 
instruments. 
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 In this section, we endogenize economic policy as this is reflected by the three 
fiscal instruments τ, θ, and R. We assume a benevolent government that plays a 
Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the private sector. This corresponds to the situation where 
agents make consumption-investment decisions by taking fiscal policy variables as given 
and then the government chooses fiscal instruments taking the response functions of 
agents as given.17 That is, the government maximizes the utility of the agents taking the 
market allocation as a constraint, the latter being summarized by the growth rate equation 
(11). We assume commitment technologies on behalf of the government, so that 
decisions cannot be altered.18 
 To characterize the second-best equilibrium we use as objective of the benevolent 
government the sum of lifetime utilities of all agents over generations discounted by a 
factor ρ , )1,0(∈ρ , reflecting social time preference expressed as19 
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17
 An alternative approach would be to solve for the first-best (command-optimum) equilibrium where the 
benevolent government chooses the fiscal policy variables and consumption-investment decision rules at 
the same time. Aside from the fact that this approach is less realistic (since a government is unlikely to 
have control over private investment and consumption decisions), it should also be noted that the key 
feature of our model is the existence of three different forms of corruption, which are exogenously given. 
Given that corruption is undetectable in our framework, a benevolent government has to choose its 
instruments appropriately while acknowledging that corruption does and will exist in equilibrium. In this 
context, the concept of an omniscient social planner that ‘internalizes’ corruption is difficult to fathom, and 
we therefore abstract from considerations of how a decentralized economy could replicate the social 
optimum (as, for example, could be studied when the services from public goods are affected by 
congestion), and focus on the government’s second-best policy, which is termed the ‘optimal’ policy. 
18
 Recent applications of this problem can be found in Park and Philippopoulos (2002), Espinosa-Vega and 
Yip (1999, 2002), and Chen (2005). 
19
 We follow the conventional practice of ignoring the initial old’s utility in the evaluation of social welfare. 
20
 Espinosa-Vega and Yip (1999) illustrate that [ ] 01)(11)(' <+∆−+−≡ σσσσ RRqRY . 
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The first term in the brackets of equation (15’) represents the agents’ income associated 
with legal practices, while the second part denotes the income obtained through corrupt 
activities.21 Welfare, therefore, depends on both the legal and the illegal income of 
agents. The reason for including illegal income in the government’s welfare function is 
that in our set-up, corruption is not detectable (which means that even though the 
government may know the distribution of agents indulging in corrupt practices, it does 
not know a particular agent’s type). If corruption were actually detectable, the optimal 
corruption rate would have been zero, and if punishment strategies were not costly, the 
appropriate choice of fiscal instruments would have brought corruption down to zero. 
However, in circumstances such as these, the government has to choose instruments 
while acknowledging the distortions imposed by the presence of corrupt practices (and 
hence, illegal income) to attain the second-best. In other words, given that corruption 
influences both types of income, legal income being affected through the marginal 
product of private capital, b, any changes in corruption induce the government to 
optimally adjust its fiscal policy variables to ensure an undistorted level of welfare. 
Total differentiation of equation (15’) and use of the growth rate equation (11), 
yield the results of the comparative statics in Propositions 5-7, the proofs of which appear 
in Appendix B.  
 
Proposition 5: The optimal response of the government to an increase in corruption 
related with the collection of tax revenue (decrease in η) is to decrease both the share of 
government expenditure and the rate of return on holding money. It also raises the 
income tax rate, providing the effect of taxes on legal income dominates that on illegal 
income. The combined effect of all these is a fall in the steady-state growth rate. 
 
Starting from an initial equilibrium, a decrease in η implies that a higher proportion of 
tax revenues is appropriated by corrupt bureaucrats, which increases the illegal income 
component in the government’s objective function. This will increase overall 
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 As described earlier, only legal income is intermediated through financial corporations. 
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consumption and utility, and in the circumstances, the government should make use of its 
fiscal instruments to reduce the growth rate and, therefore, utility. To this effect, it should 
bring about a decrease in the optimal share of public expenditure and/or a decline in the 
optimal rate of return on holding money, both of which will lead to a decrease in the 
growth rate and, thereby, utility. The government can also additionally use its tax rate 
instrument. A rise in the tax rate can reduce the post-tax marginal product of capital and 
reduce the growth rate via the legal income channel, while it will raise consumption via 
the illegal income channel (as the possibility of embezzlement out of corrupt income 
rises). If the latter effect is small, then a tax increase would be the optimal response from 
the government. 
 To establish the steady-state growth effects of the above actions, note from 
equation (11) that 0)(' and 0,)(' ,0)(' >>< Rγθγτγ . Since both θ and R are optimally 
reduced, while the tax rate can go in any way, in response to a decrease in η, the total 
effect on growth is ambiguous. An unambiguously negative growth effect is obtained 
only when the optimal income tax rate rises. 
 
Proposition 6: The optimal response of the government to an increase in corruption 
related with the procurement of productive public goods (increase in χ) is in general 
ambiguous. However, if corruption has a greater effect on legal income, the government 
optimally increases both its share of expenditure and the rate of return on holding 
money, while it lowers the income tax rate. The combined effect of all these is a rise in 
the steady-state growth rate. 
 
An increase in χ implies a lower marginal product of capital (as far as legal income is 
concerned), lower growth and lower steady state utility. In order to increase utility, higher 
future consumption via an increase in the growth rate is called for, which can be achieved 
through an increase in θ and/or R. However, a rise in χ implies more illegal income and 
consumption, for which the government is called for to do the opposite (i.e., decrease θ 
and/or R). If the former effect dominates, then the government’s optimal response is to 
bring about an increase in the share of public expenditure and/or a rise in the rate of 
return on holding money. Which way the tax rate instrument will be adjusted depends on 
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the considerations discussed in the previous case (where a change in η was considered). 
In sum, a reduction in the tax rate would be called for to increase long-run growth and 
welfare, if the proportion of legal income earned by bureaucrats is higher than that of 
illegal income. 
 
Proposition 7: The optimal response of the government to an increase in corruption 
related with the productivity of public goods (increase in λ) is to increase both the share 
of government expenditure and the rate of return on holding money. It also reduces the 
income tax rate, providing the effect of taxes on legal income dominates that on illegal 
income. The combined effect of all these is a rise in the steady-state growth rate. 
 
An increase in λ implies a lower marginal product of capital (as far as legal income is 
concerned), lower growth and lower steady state utility. In order to achieve higher future 
consumption and utility, an increase in the growth rate is called for, which can be 
achieved through an increase in θ and/or R. The way the government will adjust the tax 
rate depends on the following considerations: A reduction in the tax rate will raise the 
after-tax marginal product of capital, the growth rate and consumption via the legal 
income channel, while it will reduce consumption via the illegal income channel (as the 
possibility of embezzlement out of corrupt income falls). If the latter effect is small, then 
a tax decrease would be the optimal response of the government, which – together with 
an increase in θ and/or R (noted earlier) – would lead to higher growth and welfare. 
Propositions 5-7 illustrate that the optimal choice of fiscal variables by the 
government in response to the various types of corrupt practices could, in general, give 
rise to an ambiguous effect on growth. These findings are consistent with the results 
obtained in Propositions 2-4, under exogenous adjustment of fiscal variables, where 
corruption has also been found to have in general an ambiguous growth effect. But as to 
the effects of corruption on all fiscal instruments and growth, one can also identify 
similarities between the governments’ passive and active policy-making decisions under 
more specific conditions, as these have been presented in the various corollaries and 
Propositions. For instance, Propositions 1 and 5 along with Corollary 4.1 state that higher 
corruption in the form of tax revenue appropriation leads jointly to a lower rate of return 
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on holding money (and thus higher seigniorage revenue), higher tax rate, lower public 
spending, and following these, lower output growth. These hold, however, only when the 
government is large and the effect of taxes on legal income dominates that on illegal 
income. The same results are also obtained under higher embezzlement in the 
procurement of productive public goods, as described in Propositions 2, 6 and Corollary 
4.1. The required conditions now though are a large government size and the effect of 
corruption being greater on illegal income. It is only under the third type of corruption 
(related with the productivity of public goods) that the exogenous and endogenous 
adjustments of fiscal variables, and hence growth, do not match each other.  
In general, a government that acts in such a way as to optimally choose its fiscal 
instruments in the presence of corruption leads to growth outcomes that are in line with 
those under a government that adjusts its fiscal choices to run a balanced budget. 
Therefore, in connection with the growth and welfare effects of corruption, our findings 
show that it may not be critical whether the government takes a passive or an active 
stance in setting its fiscal variables, although one can identify the channels through which 
a benevolent government could attempt to mitigate the negative effects of corruption on 
economic growth. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper studied, via a unified analytical framework, the effects of corruption on an 
economy’s growth rate, and on the policy instruments (income tax rate, inflation rate, and 
size of government spending) that are employed when bureaucratic corruption takes three 
forms: it reduces the tax revenues that are raised from households, inflates the volume of 
government spending, and reduces the productivity of effective government expenditure. 
Moreover, our analysis has distinguished between the case where fiscal choices are 
effectively determined exogenously through the balanced budget constraint, and the case 
where the government sets its instruments in an optimal manner to achieve the second-
best policy outcome.   
 The effects of corruption on fiscal policy variables as well as growth are, in 
general, ambiguous. But once specific conditions are taken into account (as identified in 
the paper), the transmission effects become clear. The conditions that critically guide the 
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direction of the effects, under both a passive and an active stance by the government, 
amount to the size of the government, the original distribution of government revenue 
between seigniorage and taxes, and the relative effect of taxes on legal and illegal 
income. The nature of these effects has not hitherto been explored in the literature. 
Moreover, our analysis - by combining the literature on corruption in public spending and 
finances with that on fiscal policy and growth - has established some results that could 
rationalise some of the findings in the earlier literature in the area. 
Our research could be extended in different directions. One line of enquiry would 
be to estimate the effects of the different types of corruption in public expenditure and 
revenue on growth using panel data for a large group of countries. This would 
supplement the work of Blackburn et al. (2010) on corruption on the revenue side of the 
government budget constraint. Another direction in which our research could be 
conducted is to study the case where bond financing (rather than money financing) of 
deficits – along with tax financing – is considered feasible. This would be an interesting 
exercise in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact, which assigns upper limits to 
deficits and debt for EMU members, and virtually rules out seigniorage.  
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In obtaining the signs of a14, a15, a24, and a25, we have used the expression of b from the 
output per capita equation (2’), from where it can be shown that 0/ <∂∂ χb  and 
0/ <∂∂ λb . 
Using equation (A1), we can derive the inflation and growth effects of a change in 
corruption related with the collection of tax revenues; that is, of a lower η. These are 
Det
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d
dR 13212311 −
=
η
, (A2) 
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, (A3) 
where ‘Det’ is the determinant, for which the expression is provided in equation (A9) 
below. 
 
Using equation (A1) again, we can derive the inflation and growth effects of a change in 
corruption related with the procurement of public goods; that is, of a higher χ. These are 
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Finally, using equation (A1) we can derive the inflation and growth effects of a change in 
corruption related with the productivity of public goods; that is, of a higher λ, as  
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So, the determinant becomes 
 37
0
1
1
1
1
111
1
<












−
+
∆+
+∆
−=
+σ
σ
γ
σ
σ
r
R
q
q
R
b
Det . (A9) 
Using equation (A9) along with the expressions for aij defined above into the pairs of 
equations (A2)-(A3), (A4)-(A5), and (A6)-(A7) respectively, we obtain that 0/ >ηddR , 
0/ >ηγ dd , 0/ <χddR , 0/ <χγ dd , 0/ <λddR , and 0/ <λγ dd , which form the 
basis for Propositions 1a-3a. 
 
 
A(II). 
 
Using the condition that changes in seigniorage are set to zero, the new matrix form 
expression for the set of equations (11’) and (13’) now is  
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Using equation (A10), we can derive the income tax rate and growth effects of a change 
in corruption related with the collection of tax revenues; that is, of a lower η. These are 
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where ‘DET’ is the determinant, for which the expression is provided in equation (A17) 
below. 
 
Using equation (A10) again, we can derive the income tax rate and growth effects of a 
change in corruption related with the procurement of public goods; that is, of a higher χ. 
These are 
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Finally, using equation (A10) we can derive the income tax rate and growth effects of a 
change in corruption related with the productivity of public goods; that is, of a higher λ, 
as  
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In equations (A11)-(A16) the determinant is given by 
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Using equation (A17) along with the expressions for bij defined above into the pairs of 
equations (A11)-(A12), (A13)-(A14), and (A15)-(A16) respectively, we obtain that 
0/ <ητ dd , 0/ >ηγ dd , =χτ dd / ambiguous, =χγ dd /  ambiguous, 0/ <λτ dd , and 
=λγ dd /  ambiguous, which form the basis for Propositions 1b-3b. 
 
 
A(III). 
 
Corollary 2.1: A necessary condition for 0/ <χγ dd  is 14 22 24 12 0b b b b− < , which 
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Simplifying equation (A18), yields 
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A sufficient condition for this inequality to hold is that 
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Finally, this condition simplifies to 
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where the left-hand side of the inequality represents revenue from seigniorage. 
 
Corollary 3.1: A condition for 0/ <λγ dd  is 15 22 25 12 0b b b b− < , which implies 
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which, as before, simplifies to the condition (A21). 
 
 
A(IV). 
 
Using the restriction that changes in total government revenue are set to zero, the new 
matrix form expression for the set of equations (11’) and (13’) now is  
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Using equation (A23), we can derive the effects of a change in corruption associated with 
the collection of tax revenues (a lower η) on government expenditure and growth. These 
are 
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where ‘Det’’ is the determinant, for which the expression is provided in equation (A30) 
below. 
 
Using equation (A23) again, we can derive the effects of a change in corruption 
associated with the procurement of public goods (a higher χ) on government expenditure 
and growth. These are 
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Finally, using equation (A23) we can derive the effects of a change in corruption 
associated with the productivity of public goods (a higher λ) on government expenditure 
and growth. These are 
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In equations (A24)-(A29) the determinant is given by 
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Multiplying and dividing through equation (A30) by θ, and using equations (2’) and (5), 
yields  
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' , (A31) 
the sign of which is in general ambiguous. The sign depends on the relative size of total 
spending on public goods and services (as a fraction of GDP). If this ratio is large, then 
Det’ < 0 and the effects captured by equations (A24)-(A29) can be assigned the following 
signs: 0/ >ηθ dd , 0/ >ηγ dd , 0/ <χθ dd , 0/ <χγ dd , 0/ <λθ dd , and 0/ <λγ dd . 
If g/y is relatively small, the opposite effects take shape. These findings form the basis for 
Corollary 4.1. 
 
 
B. 
 
Our economy is populated by two types of agents, households and bureaucrats, of which 
bureaucrats are divided into those that oversee the collection of tax revenue and the 
procurement of the public good. In these two classes of bureaucrats, there are in place 
both honest and corrupt public officials. This description of the structure of our economy 
shows that there is no such thing as one representative agent. Therefore, when the 
benevolent government is deriving the welfare criterion, Ω in equation (15), it takes into 
account the discounted lifetime utility of all agents. Given that utility is solely based on 
consumption during the second period of the agents’ lives, the appropriate measure of 
welfare is a function of the total level of consumption in the economy during the agents’ 
lifetime. 
 
The income of households and the legal income of bureaucrats are saved with the 
financial intermediaries, while the illegal income of bureaucrats is saved “under the 
mattress.” This means that only the income saved through banks is subject to an uncertain 
rate of return conditional on the probability of the agent’s relocation. The illegal income, 
on the other hand, carries no rate of return. This latter income is represented by the total 
amount appropriated by corrupt bureaucrats: ])1)[(1( tt yw χεθτηµ +−− . 
 
From equations (15), (1), and (7), the benevolent government maximizes 
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where 
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subject to the economic growth rate equation (11), which we re-write here for 
convenience 
)()1( Rb ∆−=
µ
ατγ . (B3) 
 
Using equations (2’), (3), (4), (8), and (9) into equation (B2), the latter becomes 
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where 
[ ] [ ] 0)()1()](1[)( 11 >∆−+∆−≡ −+−+ σσσσ β RbqRRqRY . 
Using equation (B2’) and the growth rate equation (B3), some algebra reveals that 
equation (B1) becomes equation (15’), or 
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If we totally differentiate equation (B4) with respect to θ, R, τ, η, χ, and λ, we obtain the 
comparative static results in Propositions 5-7. In particular, for Proposition 5 
0>
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d
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η
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d
 and 
η
γ
d
d
 are ambiguous, (B5) 
while 
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For Proposition 6, 
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Finally, for Proposition 7, 
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